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IRRGATION LAWS OF THE WST.

THB18I

FOR DEGREE OF LLPB

G&ERUSiARRISON D8 LA VERPGNEJh*B.

UORNELL UNIVERSITY,

loo woa- w

4au AV

Q

0-u
Auoft
low

I
IRRI)QATION LAWS

OF THE WSST.

Of the great region lying west of the

MielsiSdl-

ppi, only a vex1y small portion can be cultivated
without

the aid of Irrigation*

Vast areae in Q lordQ,

Arizona and ealifornis are parched ,alkaline ad
The

arid.

1malmountain steams serve to mark here and there

the brown plain, with a vivid line of green; and tho
greater stoevD

like the Arkansas and the )Platte huwl

themselves tumultuously from out :their da&r,narrqpw
canons, to be Swallowed up only too soon in the
desert.

tLI

I..

The clouds which float in white masses over

the plains hardly di1till more than
upon the parched earth.
region water should be

&

passing shower

Little wonder that in such a
osdered almost as valualle

as the gold or silve? hidden within the depths of the

mountains.

And in dealing with the subject of

irrigation the assemblies of the people have a most
Serious matter for ligislation and the courts for
cons truct i ofn.

9'
naturally in the process of application of th& law,
to

an entirely new

and strange situation, severaul

different theories have arisen. s3ince some adopt the
Common law
yet others

,

and some employ it

with variations and

have displayed a startling

originality

of their own in dealing with the subjectthe reault is
interesting but slightly *omplicated.

Prof

Pomeroy

is the only Jurist who has extlored systematically
the western wilderness of decisions relatirg to
irrigation and his lectures on "Riparian Rights"- will
prove a valuable guide to anyone

investigating

ths

new field open to legal study.
In dealing with the laws relating to
irrigation I $hall

Oonsder them under the following

heads:
A*

ommon

law theory

of Ripariai Rights,

Bt Irrigation in relation to the public donzLn.
C. The

yestem in Oalifornia and Nevada,

D.
oolorado system*

3

LAW THEORY

(vi1vk

F RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

In dealing with such an unstable element as water
the common law found an exoelent subject for its

well-

known subtelty of interpretation and distinction,
The common lay started with the premise
derived from the Roman

Law that water was publici JustS,

an element wherein the people

had an Interest which

extended to the use of It but it
bonum vacuns,

was in no sense

so that the first occupant could make

his right absolute to the exclusion of the Interest
of others.
A few of the early English cases follow
the civit law which holds that water is the property
of the prior appropriator to the extent of his appropriation Ad this is adopted by many of the western
states,

But the true doctrine of the common law as

adopted by the English courts regard the proprietors
as posseWi iC

only a usufructuary interest In

the

waters of a stream whereby he could use a reasonable
amnonnt provided the stream was not lowered appreciably

which would constitute an injury to others holding
lands upon the ,same stream.

4
In J3brey v

.vwen( 3 2

353*), an important case

the court says as to the aourt which may be utiliZed
by the consumert"It is entirely a question of degree
and it is impossible to define precisely the limits
which seperate the reasonable from the wiongful use o-f
the water,"
This right of the reparian proprietor to
the use of the water is a corporeal heredtament it is
"Inseperably annexed tb the soil and passes with It not
as an easement or apurtenarme but as pareeltuse d1d not
create it and disuse cannot destroy it*"
Yet this right Is in the nature of an
easement as the proprietors estate Is dominant when
he makes use of the ,water and servient to the right of
others to have the water ?low over his land so tkat
they ray use it.
It is understocd that the natural righto of
the proprietors may be affected by the appropriation
of the water by one of their number in derogation of
their claims for the s pace ef twenty years.

title

This is

obtained by prescription and presupposes a grant,

Also the riparian proprietor has the right at common

law to the use of the water for his natural wants,

to supply his family 4nd stock with an amount suffi(ient
to their needs, though the entire stream should be
consumedo
It was ingeniously

argued in Evans v

Merriweather ( 3 Soune 496. ) that in arid reglons like
the West the use of water for irrigation would be a
-natural want and therefore would Justify,the use of
the water to the l4mit

f the necessity.

This was

reJected in Texas and California, but it forms part of
the foundation

on which the doctrine by priority

of appropriation rests*..The doctrine of the common
law prevails., as stated above. generally through out
the United States with the exceptions of certain
Jurisdictions which will be mentioned further on.

0

IRRIGATION IN RELATIQN TO THE PUBLIC DOAINo

The Act

10th, o

of Uongress passed the

july "1466 is the basis of all water rights

on the public lands;it Is as follows:
"Whenever by priority of possession,rights to
the use of water for nutacturnf,miningagriculture
or other purposes have accrued and the same are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs~aws
and

decisions of the courts, the possessor and owner

of such vested rights shall be maintained and respected
in the same; a d the right of way for the construction
of ditches ard canals for the purposes herein
apeolfied is acknowledged and enjoined,"

Amendment July 9th, 1820o;
*All patents

granted or presotiptions or homesteads

allowed, shall be subject to any vested rights or
accrued water rights or rights to ditches

and

reservoirs used In corection with such water rights
as roay have been acquired under

or recognised by the

ninth section of such act as this is amendatory,"
The working of this statute is as the

7

supreme

ourt romarls rather unfortunate. And its

Oonstruotion has given rise to a considerable unCertainty in interpretation by the courts.

Though

Oongress grounds,the rights of the miners and settlers
on the Custorm, statutes and decisions of the several
ekates, the real basis for the doctrine of appropriation
oa the publidomain is the-reeegnition by the states
,to the appropriation by pri'r

of an-implied liemm

right- on the publiO domain# by the United -Stat*a
to ue the #ater -as

the government is in fat the

only party who has the right to object, ,For

in

Californis the statute and decisions of the courts
which are ofuzore authority than the

of .the
tount-ar

ocomionaw sytem of water righte
settloza, adopt the
which isldiametricall
of

ppreprioat ion

p'o11e&

to the doctrine

and yet the latter oontrols on the

public lands*

The courts

0±'

the Wester

states

following the supreme court of the United 8tates
decide that priority of appropriation is valid against
the pat ent ee of the governmnt who obt ains his pat ent
subsequent to the..' passage of the act of 186 and if
the prior

appropriation of the water of a stream is

8

subsequent to the said act

it

will avall against- a

later patent,
But suppose the priority of approprsla
tion and the issving of the patent to the land
antedate the statute

both

what effect will this have on the

relation of the prior appropriator and the patentee
from the government.,

If A.appropXIates the water of

a stream to his beneficial use in 188Q and B.'in 1864
obtains

Land upon

must B's rigt

the stream under governmert patent.

as a riparian owner be subject to A's

use of the water,

This question was first decided

in the important oases of Van Sikle v Haines ( 7 Nov
41

j and Lux v Haggin

( U Pa.Rep. 6144.)4Judge

Lewis of the Nevada oourt in an elaborate opinion held,
that a patent issued prior to 1866 conveyed to the
patentee

not only the land but the right to the use

of the water of the stream flowing through it.

Since

the United States has the absolute and perfect title
to land

and there can be no presoription against the

government it

follows

that the prior appropriation be±oe

the statute must yield tG the subsequent patentee.
The statute of 1886 is

prospective in its action and

9
relates to rights arising after its passage.
this

case is

as touching

But

in Jones v Adams ( 19 NeVP,

overruled

the doctrine above stated.

86d.

Th* Supreme

Court of the United States has not had this question
In Broder v Water Co.

directly before it.
it

( 101 UoS. 04)

was said that the act of IR66 "was rather a

recognition of a pre-exrieting pight of poeessln,
constituting a valid olaimito Its oontinued uae,than
the establishment of a new one. "on

this case and

especially this clause the Oolorado and Nevada courts
b as C

havetheir decisions that

the appropriatoro before

the statute has the right to water as against the
subsequent patentee of the gove~rnnt,

But In Lux v

Jaggin the Galifornla court holds that this language
cannot be construed

as a recognitlon by the court of

vested rights in appropriatores of water created by
mre appropriation
Gould on Wstoem
prospectivein it
pat eA

rid independent of statute,"

Also

to the same effeot.#The statute is
operation

i-ued before its

ly issued to a person

and does not affect a

passage or a patent subsequent-

who had paid for the land prior

to the act,"
The language of the Unit ed States court in

10

Broder v water Go. shows a tendency toward the recognition of the doctrine, of appropriation

as pre-Oexistet

to the statute and the amendment of' IM

are subject to

says that patents ,hbmesteads,etc,

*such water rights as may

,when it

have been acquired under or

recognized by the ninth section of sbch act/it seem
especially

intended to protect the interest

prior appropriator

jtwhat soever time he may have

acquired the right to the water.
ed

of the

It

must

be remember-

that the act of 1866 was framed to give protection

to those

who depending

on the implied license of the

government

had taken water somet imes at great expense

and used It

in mining or the cultivation of the soil

and the act was merely confirmative of this license,
The 8tate courts
doctrine

have recognized expressly that the

of appropriation

obtains

on the public land

of the United States aside from any that may exist under
the state statutes,
United States
to the streams

It

Is

certain

that so far as the

has recognized any dootrine as applicable
on the public domain it

has been the

doctrine of' appropriation and not the common law

theory of' riparian

rights.

Ii
If however both
have -acquired
ment
one

there

no title

parties are mere occupant3
to the land

and

from the govern.

is no questionthat as between them ,the

making the prior appropriation pf the waters of .a

stream cannot be disturbed

in his right to the amunt

appropriated by a subsequent appropriator though the
latter

should

hold his land on the banks of the

stream , while the prior appropriator
a distance

should dwell at

and transport the water by means of ditches.

is

THEC ALIFORIlA AND NSVADA DOTRINE.

The common law theory of water righta,
rendered venerable by precedent tpd secure by authority
seemed destined for a time to hold a large part

of.the

4eat against the enoroachments of the new doctrine of
appropriation by priority of use,
the

aliforniaasupreme courzt&f4d

judge Mckinstrey of
udge Lewis of tha,.

Nevada court, two of the most eminent Jurists the west
has pjv.L*#d-, joined the shlelds of their protection

over the common law theory.

Also Prof. Pomeroywith this

great learning and extraordinar
principles

grasp of legal

cawe to the aid of Galifornia and Nevada

But in spite of these distinguished champions,

Courts,

the corx.uion law theory has lost ground
has retreated

to its

last stronghold in

The California Code
1410 to 1421. enacts ezpressly
priation
whi+ch

until finally it

from section

that priority by appro-

shall prevail and providi

it shall be accomplished

alifornia.

the methods by

But
i
sectionLI22 of

of the civil code is as follows;
"The rights of riparian proprietors
are not affected by the provisions of this title,"

Lux v Haggin

( 10 Pao Rep* 739,.), a case

which has been rightly said)constitutes a thorough
treatise

on water rights, holds that this section

protects

not only riparian rtghteL;-'of those who acquir-

ed a title to land from the state

after the adoption

of the code and before appropriati n of water In
accordanwe with the provisions of the code.
iob'"says judge Imkinstrey

'

on this branch of the

case Is that section 1422 saves and, protects
ripiaria

4oW
uConalus°

the.

rights of all those who under the land laws

of the -4tato shall have acquired from the state the
right of :posession to *tract. of riparlan land
prior to the initiation of proceeding

to appropriate

water in accordance with the provisions of the code.
The State might have reserved from her grants of land
the waters flowing through them for the benefit of
those who Should subsequently appropriate the waters,
but the statute has not -made such reservation,

The

water rights of the state as riparian proprietor,are
not reserved to the state by section 14 £ (whenever
state has not already parted with its
who have acquired from her a legal title

the

right to th ose
to riparian

lands |the provisi ns of the code confer the Staters
rights to the flow on those appr'opriating water In the

manner presrlbed by the cOde.e
This Oonstruetion takes all the
force from the statutes

There ixists two system then

in California , but the e~mmon law one prevails to the
greatest extent.

For If the State grant land on a

streasm to a person; he inmedlately obtains the rights
of a riparian proprietor and bls estate shuts off 4ll
subsequent attempta at appropriation, for they would
of necessity
stream.

diminish hia right to the flow of the

The comnon Jaw idea of water rights was then

saved in California by .a strained construction of the
etatute,

But it

has not escaped without ivotifieation

In Harri. v Harrison (93 Cala. 631.),it was held that
the reasonable uae of the water of a ctream permit.s so
much to be taken as to appreciably
to the lower riparian proprietor.
tion from the strict

diminish the flow
This is a deroga-

construction of the rights of a

riparian proprietor at commom law.
Prof.

Pomeroy when he published his

lectures
A
on riparian rigtsin la.43,elased. Nevada with

Ualifornia and based his staten~ent

8ickle v Eaine.

IBut thie has been

on the eaae of Van

ubsequently overrul-

ed both as regards the right of the appropriator to
wat er a. against the pat enrtee of the government whos e

15

patent was issued prior to 1866,and the declaration that
the conon law furnished the prinolples

for water

rights In the state of nevada,
Pierce *amp

works v Stevenson (

Nev

In this latter case appropriaticn by priority is
expreesly adopted.

2 73.).

16
TH

CO LO RAD

SYSTEM.

The following are the sectione of the Colorado
cortilsution, wherein the theory of appropriation Is
declared.
8ec.*10.

The water of every natural strean, not hereto-

"

wit un, %he state of Colorado is

fore appropriated,
hereby

declared to be the property of the public,and

the same is

dedicated to the tie of the people of-the

State subject to appropriation as hereinaft er provided#
Sec

511,w The right to divert the unappropriated

waters of any natural stream for beneficial unes shall
never bf denied,

r16i1J of appropriation shall give

the better right

as between those using the water ?or

the same purpose,

but when the waters of any natural

stream are not sufficient for the service of all those

desiring

the use of the same, those using

for domestic

the water

purposes shAli have the preference over

those claiming for any other purpose,and those using
the water for agriculturl

preference

ptrnpoaes

over those using the same for

1hall have the
m~rnufacturing

purpo se•s."
This system
sections,

yet

q

t

is

formulated in the above

based upon them

for the right

is a prior one , it exists

and can only

aside from any statute

be denied by express enactment.

Acoordingly It would seem that when the early settlers
took the water from the stream, it was done not by
sufferarme of the state
inhereent

In the conditions of a new country.
The

water

but bya natural right

w-- of the application of the

is not material to the appropriation.

may be conveyed
intervening

by a ditch

from a strea ,acroassan

divide to some distant

illustrates the

radical difference

ranohe.

fr the latter is based on the rights

This

between this

new theory and the one which prevailed

proprietors to the water.

The water

at comon 1aw;
of the riparian

This method of distribution

is prefectly logical under the Oclorado system. Since
it is the prior beneficial use

of the water that

confers the right to it, there can be no difference
whether

it is applied on the land near the stream or

4t a great distance. The water is the appropriators to
apply to a certain purpose

place.

in a couictr

and not to a particular

like england which lies swathed

in heavy clouds during all seasons of the year' it
would be undoubtedly

an invasion of private right to

conduct t;he water away from the riparian proprietor;but

34
throughout the 4est

water is an imperative

for the pursuit of agriculture

necessity

and use npt position

give the right to the water#
Qoff in v Left hand Ditch Cow

jie imust now inquire
to what constitutes

( 68

.);.

olo,'W40

more part:cularly as

approprxiation, so as to be valid

agairat subsequent parties.

The right dose not date

from the actual applicatlon of the water to the SOi,
but

from the time the frst

step is

taken if

followed up ,;Yith reasonable promptness.
ranch4mtns.

it

Ia

Thua,If a

begins the construction of his ditch on

Zuly first

,

and by the middle of August has the water

flowing on his fields the apprpriation dates from July
let,
in

proyiding

there has been no %jnreasonabledelay

prosecuting the work.
"Although

deemed complete
still

if

satep

not

until the actual diversicn of the water

such has been prosecuted

diligence,
first

the appropriation is

the right relates

with reasonable

to the

time when the

was taken to secure it."

Liker et al v JFink etal ( 7 Cblo. 1514 .
The next. elemient ini the theory of
appropriation is

the application of the water to some

useful purpose .

The prior appropriator will not be

Gllowed to waste the water merely because he was the
first to take it

from the stwean.

But so long as he

the quantity originally appropriated

applies

can cot--plaln,

ore

though the last drop of water be consum-

ed,
It
time od
livir

that

is however provided by statute

'~a
c-h

t

.

zai

when the water becomes low tho'ase

on the steam

can use all of it

for domestic purposesi even if
has none for his land,

if

neceS$ary

the prior approprii,tor

A manufacturer

who has

certain amount of water appropriated for his

a

purpogi

must in times of scarcity of water give way to the nLes
of the ranchimen for irrigaticn.
and equitable , and is

This is but just

declared by the conmon law

doctrine as well.

THEI-IJGHTS CF DITCH CQI-,PANI

.

When the Colorado Court came to consider the
status of diteh companies conveying water for the use

of the ranchemen it

waz confronted with

&

question

complex and difficult.
The Company does not have cny ownership in

the water#

It is merely an agent to carry the water

to the consumer.

But as regards the outside world and

subsequent, appropriators its priority of right to the
water cannot be assailed.

It is not strictly an agent,

common carrierer, or owner but combines some of the
elements from these three legal conceptions,
Wheeler v Northern Colo. I. Co. is the first
ease which considers systematically the rights of the
ditch corporations under the system of appropriation
Judge Helm states the conclusion of the courto as
followsl

"After appropriation the title tc this water,

save perhaps as to the limited quantity

that may be

tatually flowing in the consumers ditch or lateral
remains In the general public while the paramount
right to Its use unless forfeited continues in the
appropriation,

The Colorado doctrine of ownership and

appwopriation as declared in the constitution, statutes
and .decisions necessarily gives the carrier of
water an exceptional status;a status differing somewhat from that of the ordinary carrier.

Qertain peculi

ar rights are acquired in connection with the water
diverted; they are dependent for their birth and continued ezistence on the use made by the consumer.

Eut

the carrier does not become the proprietor of the water

21
diverted.

The carrier does not possess a saleable

interest in the water.
Under the constitution the carr*er is
a quasi-wpublic servant or agente

It is not the attitude

of a private individual contracting for the sale or
use of property.

It is permitted to acquire certain

rights against those subsequently diverting from the
same natural stream.
eminent domain,

It may exercise the power of

It is charged with a public trust only

to exact reasonable rates*"
This is as full and clear an
exposition of the right of water carrters as the reports
furnisho

Yet it impresses one as a composite photogr-.

aph of a group of legal corceptions and perhaps it is
futile to expect a true unity in such a blending,
It is not a carrier strictly because compensation is
hot paid for the carrying of the water but for its use
aMthe property is neither in the carrier or the
consumer.

-

It is not the owner because the state

occupies that poSition though it possesses some of the

rights of ownership.

It is not strictly an agent becaus-.

e the iznietive lies with the company anid as regards the

Status it is

more nearly a trustee,
There is force in the view taken by

Judge Reed, in the case of Wyatt v Laimer ( 1 Colo.
of Appeals 4 ,o9 that the 'compa iy. La .-.
tarrier but is

Ct.

C1

a corporation with the title

to the water

and subject to legislativre control on account of its
quasil-public furations,

However the Supreme cOUrt

overruled this case in Wyatt v Irrigaticn Co.

18

Colo. 3(8..
A moot question has arisen as to the
privitles of consumers taking water from the canal of
the carrier.

udge Helm in FoH.L.C.c R. CQ. v Southworth

(J3 Colo. 112, held that the coneumershave priority of
even date

and the statute requiring

shall pro ratt

that consumers

in times of scarcity is not affected by

the claim to priority by a consumer ,because he may
have used the water from the ditch before some other.
The appropriation is

completed by the consumer putting

the Water to a beneficial use
for its protection
clairm Qf the

and the priority vests

in the ditch company

against the

other companies or individuals who

are subsequent appropriators
Judge Elliot t held on the other hand

C) r'

(.j q-)

that there was priority of appropriation among the
In the same manner as if

consumers,

the water from the natural stream.
striCtly an agent.

they were taking

The carrher is

The water of the natural stream

irrespective of the mode of diversion is
the public.

dedicated to

There are two priorities,-

the carriers

established by statute as amatter of convenience and the
Consumers priority based on the law of nature.

And the

statute in regard to prorating applies only where the
ditch is

constructed as a conm.n enterprise by the

various consumers.
This appears well enough in theory,
but as Judge Helm

pointed out it

would lead to perplex-

ince the determinatiQn of

ing results in practice,

numerous priorities arising so close together in time

would lead to endless litigation.

It would also seem

that the system of double priorities

is

illogical.

For the cases have declared that the doctrine of appropriation by priority

is

derived from the

and the statutes are merely deW'larat

and it

carnot be divisible

ience

and by natural right.

natural law

ns of this right

into a priority by convenThere cannot be two

seperete priorities existing in the same water at the

24

same time , as the priority of the canal company and
the consumer.

This question has not yet been decided

in the Colorado court, since in this case Judge hayt
placed his decision on a technicality.

But the

practical necessities of the situation will doubtless
lead the court to adoot

the view of Zudge t-elm.

The next question that arises in the consider&l
tion of this subject

is the exact

nature

to water acquired by apprcpriation.

of the right

At cormon law the

water of a stream passed as incident to the land.
a parcel of it

was

and not regarded as appurtenanteAnder

the theory which w;e are considering
use of the ,iater is
what kind is

It

the right to. the

admitted to be property

,but of

an uraettled question,
The right to vrater acquired by appropriat-

ion i-

transfer

species of the realty

ad

requires for it

the same form and solemnity

required

of any other part of the real

for the

oniveyanCe

estate,"

8mtth V C'Idara ( 4.3 Cal.
"

as is

The

37i.)"

appropriators

right to have the

25

water flow in the natural stream to the head of the
ditch is

an incorpovial hereditament appurtenant to his

dit ch."

1 16 Cal# 4(8o)*

In Uolorado
further in developing

the deeisions have gone

the ±dea that water acquired by

priority of appropriation is

a distf

tproperty r~ght.

"Water instead of being a mere incident to the soil
rises when appropriated to the dignity of an usufructor right in prxperty!"

uary es-tate,

offin v Left Hand Ditch Col

6 Colo.)

In the leading case of "trikler v Colo,
springs ( 16 Qci.
originally-applled

j614,it ,as held " THat water
to specific land for irrigation

could be sold and taken out at a different point,
could be carried in a difforont ditch in no way
connected with the land itid c9uld by the purchaser be
applied to

follows,

a different and distant

that

irrigation

is

the right to the

*destro r its valuer

there fm.%m

in the conclusion,

that the priority to the use of water is

To lihmit its transfer

for

connected

ay not be coperatd

The authorities seemn to corcur

logically

w-e of the water

a right not so inseperabl.

with the lnrId that it

righto

It

use.

a property

would. in many eases

What differense can it

make to other s

26

whether

the owner

the water of

of the priority

in this case
to others,"

his o.n land or sells it

to regard

This case shows a tenwlency
this property in water aseperate

pe rronal property.

followed out in 1 Colo. tV.of Appeals

View is

This

uses

r,,here the vuateir is

regarded

494

subject to

as a chattel

the same rules as govern personal property.
in

This was however overruled
,

where it

was decided* that the propercy in

and passed as appurtenant

was. an easement

land , except that

its source of supply

use might

be changed.

the ditch

occupies the

is

or

positioln of the servient

-water rigrht

vague and unsatisfactory

a closer definition is

attempted

equires

the water is

not taken by grant

Alwo an easement is

And when

confusion results.

difficult to see how an easement

Sinc e presc ripti n c annt run

ion 0

and place of

by the courts to the water acquired by

appropriation

is

to the

!hich constitutes the dominant estate."
The phrase "proe-%ty ight" as

ap*led

It

water

The natural water course

"

estate and the very ext tence cf

a us?

13 Col

can arise

,

agai nst the 3t ate, a~d
but through appropriat-

generally regar~ded as being
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appurtenant

to a particular estate

transferable

at vill.

servient estate

ior is

and is hardly

a stream strictly a

for an estate implieo

an individual

owner and the stream is public juris.
whatever confuncon may arise as to the
exact natlure of the oroperty in water

essential characteristic t.at must
that is the continued
beneficial use

there is

always be found

to the vter

required

.the

,

appltcaticn of the w-ater to a

There can be no absolute

conveyed

one

title

and on failure tt use it

gas

vwater beco es again subject to the

public Jurik.

Prof. Poimeroy in his work on iiparian
I

sights

has pr'ed~icted

theAc onseuences

;Jhich must

logically arise under the Color-ado systemw1. Private lands are invaded for the corstruction of
ditches

but thiz is regulated bFstatixte

lands of'the individual proprietor
by more than one ditChE

It Is

so that the

cannot be burdened

understood that the

land condemed for right cf way must be paid fo.4

2.

As the country becomes

will be endless litigaticn

.ore thickly settled there
and controver-sies arising

out of disputed claimtS t

priority.

As matter of fact ,there are comparRV

ively

DEut it was tc be expected

of irrigation.

It

cerxtain amount of litigation.

that in

there would be a

fixing the rules of a new system

is

the price paid for

alorne original lines,

development
3.

on the subject

few cases in the western reports

No legislation can be just or practical or can

tend to peace and prosperity which attempts to violate
and override natural laws and natural rightsT the
inunutable truths which exist in the regular ordea

of

nat ur e..
None ':votld care to take issue
earnest declaration

".%ith this

of the preeminence of the natural

lat; in legal jurisprudence or in the order of nature,
T-4t this natural law

is not attained

by deduction

from th*e apriorL principles handed down by sorme
teutozxic

philosopher but is reached

through induction,

The peculiar conditions and requirements of
country are facts from which

law are derived
of necessity

*The

a new

new principles of natural

common:,

law: of

the common law of Arnerica,

rgln.ino
The system of

appropriation is the
Common law in

ot

recent illustration

of the

the vestern states risinp out of natural

conditions peculiar to those states.
It is
certain inconsistenciesbut

true thet thts system , h
this is

tc be expected of a

theory in the prooess of constructicn.
scaffolding

Lut Th7en the

turnished<y
the older theories

is

removed

the doctrine of appropriation by priority will stand
complete without incongruity or inconsistency.
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